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Abstract 
The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 likely emerged from a wildlife source with transmission to humans 
followed by rapid geographic spread throughout the globe and dramatic impacts on both human health and 
global economies.  Since the onset of the pandemic, there have been several instances of human-to-animal 
transmission involving companion, farmed and zoo animals, and one instance of infection in a wild mink, with 
the clear potential for further spread into free-living wildlife.  The establishment of reservoirs of infection in 
wild animals would create significant challenges to infection control in humans and could pose a threat to the 
welfare and conservation status of wildlife.  Herein, we discuss the potential for exposure, maintenance and 
onward transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in an initial selection of wild and feral species (bats, canids, felids, 
mustelids, great apes).  Targeted surveillance and dynamic risk assessment are important tools for the early 
detection of infection in wildlife and a means of collating and synthesising emerging information in a rapidly 
changing situation.  Such efforts should be integrated with public health information to provide insights into 
the potential role of wild mammals in the continuing epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2.  This approach should 
also be adopted to address the wider need to proactively assess threats to human and animal health from 
other diseases that may emerge from wildlife.  
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Introduction 
It is estimated that there have been over 76 million cases of human infection with Covid-19 globally, with over 
1.7 million deaths [1] and widespread community transmission in many countries.  The pandemic appears to 
have originated from a seafood market selling live wild animals in Wuhan, China [2].  Evidence suggests that 
the causative coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2; previously called 2019-nCoV) emerged from wildlife, although the 
species responsible remains a ‘missing link’ and if identified would improve our knowledge of the disease 
and the mechanism for the initial host switch to humans.  Since the onset of the pandemic, human-to-animal 
transmission (zooanthroponosis) has occurred on many occasions, in multiple countries, and involving 
several species, although there is to date only very limited evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in free-living 
wildlife [3].  However, it is highly likely that further cases will emerge, since many coronaviruses have a broad 
host range [4] with the clear possibility that a reverse zoonoses spillback event from humans could lead to 
the establishment of a reservoir of infection in wild mammals [5].   
Controlling the transmission of pathogens from wild animals to humans or domestic animals is extremely 
challenging, and hence the emergence of a reservoir of SARS-CoV-2 infection in wildlife could seriously 
hamper effective disease control in the human population.  Infection in free-living wildlife would also have 
substantial practical implications for management, research, rehabilitation and conservation activities [6] and 
could generate negative public opinion towards some species leading to persecution and disengagement 
from conservation initiatives.  There is potential for both direct and indirect adverse effects on wildlife with 
implications for animal welfare, conservation and global species diversity [7].  These concerns are reflected 
in emerging guidance on how those who work directly with wildlife can reduce risks of SARS-CoV-2 
transmission to wild mammals [6,8].  However, there is also a need for risk reduction measures to be 
extended to others in the wider community who may have contact with wildlife, for example where wild 
animals are harvested and traded for food [9].  Such measures are an important first line of defence, but in 
the face of widespread infection in the human population there is a need to also plan for the implications of 
SARS-CoV-2 establishing in free-living wildlife.  This will require an assessment of the potential role of wildlife 
populations in the epidemiology of infection, and in particular identification of those species and the 
circumstances most likely to amplify to reservoirs of infection, so that surveillance, preventative measures 
and contingency plans can be developed and targeted appropriately.  Based on the available evidence, the 
potential role of wildlife in the persistence, spread, and possible re-emergence of SARS-CoV-2 is discussed 
below, and the case for targeted disease surveillance and the dynamic assessment of risks to the health of 
humans and wildlife are considered. 
Wildlife origins of SARS-CoV-2 
SARS-CoV-2 is a betacoronavirus (β-CoV), closely related to SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV which have also 
caused serious outbreaks of disease in human populations.  All are thought to have originated in bats [10], 
with evidence of intermediate or bridge hosts being responsible for virus transmission to humans [11,12,13].  
Palm civets (Paguma larvata) were identified as the initial proximal source of SARS (Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome) in humans [14], and dromedary camels (Camelus dromedarius) are a reservoir and 
source of MERS (Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome) in humans [15,16].  Although SARS-CoV-2 may 
have its ancestral origins in bats, its closest genetic ancestor (RATG13) being a β-CoV isolated from the 
intermediate horseshoe bat (Rhinolophus affinis) [12], the proximal cause of infection in humans has yet to 
be identified.  Malayan pangolins (Manis javanica) have been the subject of some speculation on the basis 
of infection with a closely related coronavirus in animals seized in southern China [17].  Sequence analysis 
of the spike glycoprotein (S) of SARS-CoV-2 and related coronaviruses suggest a series of recombination 
events between bat and pangolin coronaviruses, eventually leading to the emergence of this novel 
coronavirus [18].  However, raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides), which were identified as possible 
intermediate hosts for the SARS pandemic of 2002-2003 [19], have also been suggested as candidate 
intermediate hosts for SARS-CoV-2 as experimental infection resulted in intense viral shedding [20].  Both 
Preprints (www.preprints.org)  |  NOT PEER-REVIEWED  |  Posted: 24 December 2020                   doi:10.20944/preprints202012.0283.v2
pangolins and raccoon dogs have been found in wildlife markets in Southern China, along with many other 
wild mammals (some wild caught and others bred in captivity) and domesticated species [21,22].  Reports of 
spillover of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to companion, captive and farmed animals (see below) provide 
additional insights into other species that may have facilitated the virus jump from wildlife to humans. 
Host susceptibility 
Information on the susceptibility of animal hosts to SARS-CoV-2 is emerging rapidly.  There are several 
strands of evidence that can be used to infer the susceptibility of potential wild animal hosts , including 
predictions based on the characteristics of the host receptor to which the virus binds in order to infect cells, 
the demonstration of experimental infection of cell lines or of individual animals, and the confirmation of 
naturally acquired infection. The existence in wildlife hosts of recent progenitors of SARS-CoV-2 or 
coronaviruses with nucleotide similarity across all genes may also be useful in inferring susceptibility.    
Analysis of the angiotensin converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) protein, the functional receptor for the spike protein 
of SARS-CoV-2 in a broad range of vertebrates, has been used to predict susceptibility to infection in many 
mammal species [23,24].  Experimental studies using cell lines modified to express ACE2 have also 
demonstrated potential for SARS-CoV-2 infection in a wide variety of hosts including bats, rodents, 
cetaceans, carnivores and primates [25,26].  However, all such predictions are subject to substantial 
uncertainty and neither close phylogenetic relationships nor similarity in ACE2 protein sequences can be 
considered confirmatory for predicting susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection [27], so this information needs 
to be considered alongside other evidence.  Despite extensive in silico structural analysis and in vitro virus 
binding assessments being performed against ACE2 in numerous species, further information is required on 
the levels and locations (nasal cavity, trachea, lungs and gastro-intestinal tract) of ACE2 expression in 
different mammals to inform assessments of host susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 infection.   
Results from studies of experimental infection are available for a small number of mammal species, with 
more information emerging daily. Such studies demonstrate susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2, albeit with varying 
levels of viral replication and shedding, in domestic cats (Felis catus) and dogs (Canis lupus familiaris), ferrets 
(Mustela putorius furo), Syrian hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus), rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), 
cynomolgus macaques (M. fascicularis), African green monkeys (Chlorocebus sp.), Chinese tree shrews 
(Tupaia belangeri chinensis), common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus 
aegyptiacus), racoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides) and laboratory rabbits (Oryctolagus cuniculus) 
[20,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36].  However, experimental studies are models of disease dynamics and do 
not precisely mimic the dynamics of infection and onward transmission under natural conditions. In particular, 
experimental studies frequently overestimate susceptibility, as they often seek to maximise the likelihood of 
infection through the use of large volumes, high titre inocula and/or direct instillation to target sites.  This may 
explain the contrasting observations of effective transmission to in-contact ferrets following experimental 
infection [36] and the apparent absence of infection in pet ferrets despite close contact with infected humans 
in the same household [37].  Dogs appear less susceptible to experimental infection than cats and ferrets as 
they exhibit low levels of viral replication [33].  Two studies report that pigs (Sus domesticus) were not able 
to be infected experimentally [33,36] despite predictions based on the binding capacity of porcine ACE2 to 
SARS-CoV-2 spike proteins suggesting the opposite [26,38].   
Naturally acquired infections of SARS-CoV-2 have been demonstrated in pet dogs and cats in domestic 
settings, in tigers (Panthera tigris), lions (Panthera leo), a puma (Puma concolor) and snow leopard (Panthera 
uncia) in zoological collections, and in farmed American mink (Neovison vison) [39,40,41,42,43,44,45].  All 
these cases have been linked to initial transmission from humans to the animals in their care.  There have 
also been recorded cases of infection in what are described as ‘stray’ cats [45,46] although the extent to 
which these animals were truly free-living and their levels of contact with humans are unclear.  The only 
current confirmed infection in a wild animal is from a mink captured near a mink farm in Utah, USA where 
virus with an indistinguishable genotype was also isolated [3].      
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Persistence and spread in wildlife 
Although many viruses can switch species into new host populations, onward transmission and persistence 
are not assured, affected as they are by many inter-related factors [47].  Host susceptibility, behaviour and 
demography must align with pathogen characteristics to result in a host switching event.  In these optimal 
conditions, viral adaptation and intra-species transmission occurs at the population level, for both the host 
and viral variant selection.  Hence, in order to determine the most likely species of wild mammal and 
circumstances whereby they might play a role in the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2, we need to look beyond 
the evidence for susceptibility to infection alone.  
Evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of cases of natural infection of SARS-CoV-2 detected in 
non-human animals have been linked to transmission from infected humans to domestic or captive animals 
in their care.  Although infection has been detected in ‘stray’ cats sampled in the areas surrounding  infected 
mink farms in the Netherlands [45], the absence of genetic sequence data and no evidence of close contact 
with the mink, means that transmission from the local human population or the environment cannot be 
discounted.  Also, the extent to which the cats in question were truly free-living is unclear.  The circumstances 
of the case of SARS-CoV-2 infection in a wild mink together with genotyping evidence indicates that 
transmission from farmed mink is likely to have occurred, although the precise route is unknown [3].  Clearly, 
there are far fewer opportunities for transmission from humans to free-living wildlife than to domestic and 
farmed animals, which might subsequently transmit to free-living wildlife.  However, there are a range of 
activities involving direct human-wildlife contact which may pose significant risks, such as rehabilitation, field 
research, practical conservation work and some wildlife-related tourism.  Also, indirect transmission might 
occur where there are opportunities for human contamination of the environment (e.g. faeces in wastewater), 
supplemental food (deployed for wildlife watching, hunting or pest control purposes) or fomites (e.g. surfaces 
of traps used for hunting or pest control and which may be visited by animals that are not subsequently killed).  
However, situations where host switching through reverse zoonoses from infected humans to domestic or 
farmed animals creates several potential pathways for pathogen transmission to wildlife (see below).     
Evidence to inform whether SARS-CoV-2 infection is likely to be maintained in wild animal populations is 
extremely scant.  The animal reservoir responsible for the initial spillover into humans remains unknown, 
although phylogenetic analyses suggest that the virus lineage giving rise to SARS-CoV-2 may have been 
circulating in bats for at least several decades [48].  Experimental studies provide some evidence for intra-
species transmission via direct contact amongst racoon dogs [20], cats [33], ferrets [36,49] and Egyptian fruit 
bats [36].  For experimentally infected cats and ferrets, there is also evidence for airborne virus transmission 
[33,49,50]. Rabbits exposed to high experimental doses subsequently excreted infectious virus from the nose 
and throat, although at levels that suggested relatively low risks of onward transmission compared to other 
species [31].   
Sequencing of viral genomes has shown that natural transmission has taken place amongst farmed mink 
following initial introductions by infected workers [44,45].  Transmission amongst separately housed mink 
suggests that the infection may have been spread by fomites, respiratory droplets or contaminated dust from 
bedding [45].  Mink farms provide the only source of evidence for maintenance of naturally acquired infection 
in an animal population, transmission of infection between animal species ( i.e. potential spread from farmed 
mink to stray cats and wild mink), and spillback to humans.  The housing of mink at unnaturally high densities 
and the spatial structure of farms may facilitate spread and persistence of the virus in these captive 
populations.  Indeed, another respiratory virus, pandemic influenza A H1N1/09 of ‘swine-origin’, spread 
around the world in humans and then infected several farmed animal species including mink [51].  
Given the scale and widespread distribution of infection in the global human population, the current role of 
wildlife in the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to be negligible.  However, this could change over time, 
with the significance of a reservoir of infection in wild mammals potentially increasing as community 
transmission in human populations is reduced in the face of effective control measures. In such situations, 
the implications of spillback from a reservoir of infection in wildlife populations would be more significant. It is 
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also possible that the circulation of SARS-CoV-2 in a wild animal population might lead to the evolution of 
mutations as the virus adapts to new species, with potential implications for onward transmission and control 
in human populations.  
Potential wildlife reservoirs 
Clearly, it is not possible to assess the risks of SARS-CoV-2 in all wild mammal species, but given the 
available evidence, a priority list of species groups for initial consideration can be assembled.  Below we 
discuss the potential for exposure, maintenance and onward transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in an initial 
selection of wild and feral species, which on the basis of existing evidence could be considered of particular 
relevance.  
Bats 
Many of the known coronaviruses appear to have a bat origin [52], with over 200 identified in bats, 
representing over a third of the sequenced bat virome [53].  These include several SARS-related 
coronaviruses detected in rhinolophid bats from China, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Italy and Japan [54,55,56,57], and 
in Hipposideros and Chaerophon species from Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria [58].  The closest known genetic 
ancestor of SARS-CoV-2 (RATG13) was isolated from a rhinolophid bat in southern China [12].  The wide 
diversity of coronaviruses found in bats, suggests high potential for viral evolution in these hosts , and raises 
the potential for recombination of SARS-CoV-2 with other viruses [59].  
In addition to their role in the emergence of novel coronaviruses in  humans, bats are at risk of infection with 
SARS-CoV-2 from humans.  A preliminary analysis indicates that about 40 species of North American bats 
might be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection [60].  Although recorded instances of transmission of viruses 
from humans to bats are rare and onward spread has not been recorded [60], systematic surveillance has 
been lacking and so cases may have gone unreported.  Opportunities for pathogen transmission between 
bats and people may occur via the actions of bat carers, veterinarians, consultant ecologists, conservation 
and research workers, or through inadvertent contact between bats and humans arising from deforestation, 
mining, ecotourism and food production [61].  Humans may also come into contact with bat faeces where 
roosts and hibernation sites occur in occupied buildings.      
The high population density at which many bat species roost and high population sizes are likely to facilitate 
transmission and persistence of a novel pathogen such as SARS-CoV-2. On the other hand, the existence 
of related viruses in many bat populations may confer a level of immunity to SARS-CoV-2 and so reduce the 
likelihood that it will persist. Coronaviruses in bats typically have a narrow host range but there is genetic 
evidence of many host switching events, and that this process contributes to coronavirus evolution [62,63].   
Should SARS-CoV-2 enter a previously uninfected bat population due to transmission from humans the 
impacts would be highly uncertain, and given their nocturnal and often cryptic behaviour, population-level 
effects would be unlikely to be detected in many situations.  But the indirect consequences of detecting 
infection in a bat population could be substantial as it could precipitate an erosion of the  perceived biodiversity 
value of bats, resulting in loss of current protections and ill-conceived interventions.  Indeed, even the 
perception (with no evidence) that bats could be involved in the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 might be 
sufficient to have an adverse impact, as indicated by anecdotal reports of the killing of bats in several 
countries (India, Cuba, Peru, Indonesia and Rwanda) in misguided attempts to control Covid -19 infection in 
humans [64].  These events are concerning for bat conservation given that so many species are of threatened 
or unknown status [65].   
People working with bats are generally familiar with procedures and guidelines to minimise the risk of bat -to-
human transmission of pathogens, however in the current context IUCN guidance has been published for 
reducing the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from humans-to-bats in field research [66] and in bat rescue 
and rehabilitation centres [67].  A recent rapid qualitative assessment of the risks of SARS-CoV-2 becoming 
established in Australian bat populations concluded that the risk was low, but that uncertainty was high at 
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least in part because of the absence of data on the frequency and context of human -bat interactions [68].  
Other sources of uncertainty were unknown susceptibility to infection and the capacity for subsequent viral 
shedding in bats.     
Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 in bats could be targeted at animals coming into very close proximity with 
humans, such as those undergoing rehabilitation prior to release, those maintained in captivity or captured 
for research purposes. Priority bat populations for surveillance could include those that roost in buildings or 
public spaces (e.g. urban parks) where inadvertent contact with humans is more likely to occur. There is 
some evidence that SARS related coronaviruses are more strongly associated with bat species in the Old -
World suborder Yinpterochiroptera and those in the genus Rhinolopus in particular [60] which would suggest 
these groups could be prioritised. However available surveillance and sampling data is heavily biased by 
specific research activities, both geographically and by species, and representative sampling has not been 
undertaken. 
Felids  
Observations from experimental and natural SARS-CoV-2 infections in animals clearly suggest relatively high 
susceptibility amongst felids (Felidae family).  Both wild and domestic felids are amongst the most 
epidemiologically relevant animal hosts of SARS-CoV-2 because human-to-feline transmission has been 
sporadically recorded both in pet cats [41,46,69] and captive wild animals such as tigers and lions [42,70]. 
Moreover, there is experimental evidence for transmission amongst cats both via direct contact [71] and from 
airborne virus [33].  SARS-CoV-2 antibodies have been detected in ‘stray’ cats in Wuhan during the Covid-
19 outbreak consistent with human-to-cat transmission occurring outside the domestic setting [46], although 
possible cross-reactions with other coronaviruses need to be fully assessed.  Also, the observation of both 
SARS-CoV-2 antibodies and RNA in ‘stray’ cats in the vicinity of an infected mink farm in the Netherlands 
raised the possibility of inter-species transmission [45].  In addition, cats may theoretically be exposed to 
infection through interactions with their prey such as rabbits, and even bats, which they typically encounter 
when young or moribund animals fall from their roosts.   
Domestic cats are the most abundant felids, reaching densities in excess of 2000 animals km2 in urban areas 
[72], and their proximity to human beings, mobility and social interactions provide ample opportunities for 
inter-species pathogen transmission.  Although ‘stray’ and truly feral domestic cats typically have less contact 
with humans, they may nevertheless be exposed to human-derived infection via fomites in residential areas 
and farm environments for example.  Social interactions amongst colony-living cats may be conducive to 
intra-specific transmission, although there is no evidence for SARS-CoV-2 maintenance within cat 
populations, nor for transmission from infected cats to humans.  Nevertheless, on the basis of available 
evidence, surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 in felids could usefully prioritise free-living domestic cat populations, 
particularly where they are abundant in urban environments or in the vicinity of other sources of infection 
such as mink farms. In contrast, wild felid species tend to be more solitary, are far less abundant and seldom 
come into contact with humans and urban environments, so would not be expected to  contribute to virus 
maintenance.  However, rare and endangered species could be at risk of exposure to infected people 
involved in research and conservation programmes.  Domestic cats naturally infected with SARS-CoV-2 have 
often been reported as asymptomatic or showing only mild clinical signs, although some instances of more 
serious disease have also been reported [41,69,71], whereas only mild respiratory signs accompanied 
infection in captive tigers and lions [42,70].  It is therefore unclear whether infection could have notable 
impacts on wild felid populations.  
Canids 
There are several instances of SARS-CoV-2 infection in domestic dogs living in households with COVID-19 
positive human residents [39,40].  Nasal swabs collected from two asymptomatic pet dogs living in close 
proximity with COVID‐19 positive owners tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA and antibodies, with genetic 
sequencing confirming human-to-animal transmission [39].  However, experimental infections of five three-
month old dogs only demonstrated limited seroconversion and low levels of viral excretion, suggesting low 
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susceptibility [33].  This apparent difference in susceptibility may relate to age or breed of dog, or simply 
reflect the much larger number of dogs that must have been exposed to infected humans in the domestic 
setting.   
As clinical signs in domestic dogs appear generally mild with only limited viral shedding, the sum of evidence 
to date suggests that transmission amongst dogs and to other species is unlikely.  However, this may not 
necessarily hold true for wild canids.  For example, raccoon dogs have been shown to be susceptible to 
experimental infection and onward transmission of SARS-CoV-2 [20].  The susceptibility of other wild canids 
such as foxes, and jackals is unknown, although analysis of the ACE2 receptor predicts that red foxes (Vulpes 
vulpes) would be susceptible [73].  Onward transmission amongst free-living canids would be most likely 
where they reach high densities such as in breeding colonies or in urban feral dog populations.  Although 
raccoon dogs do not aggregate in large numbers, they have a high reproductive rate and densities of 0.2 to 
1.1 km2 [74,75] are sufficient for the effective transmission of some zoonotic viruses (e.g. rabies virus).  
However, it is the combined density of raccoon dogs and other wild carnivores, which appears to pose the 
greatest risk of rabies virus maintenance [76].  Hence, it is possible that if other sympatric carnivores are not 
particularly susceptible then maintenance of SARS-CoV-2 in wild raccoon dogs may be less likely.   
Perhaps the greatest opportunities for close interactions between humans and wild canids are in relation to 
feral and community-owned dogs, in which case risks of transmission would likely be highest during dog 
management programmes, which are undertaken in many urban areas in low-income countries for rabies 
control.  Similar opportunities may arise where wild and domestic canids are traded in markets or kept at high 
densities in breeding facilities.  In China raccoon dogs are farmed for their fur and so akin to the situation in 
mink farms in Europe and the United States (see below), there is potential for spillover of SARS-CoV-2 from 
infected workers to captive animals, followed by onward spread and spillback to humans [20].  Thus any 
surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 in canids might most usefully be targeted at urban areas with feral dogs, and 
at breeding facilities and markets.  
Mustelids 
There have been many cases of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed mink with infections reported from Europe and the 
USA [77].  Transmission among mink and spillback to humans have been confirmed [44,45], including the 
emergence of a new variant of SARS-CoV-2 in communities adjacent to mink farms in North Jutland, 
Denmark [78].  Escaped mink and the presence of other free-living mammals (e.g. feral cats and scavenging 
wild carnivores) in the vicinity of mink farms could provide potential routes for onward inter-species 
transmission, perhaps via fomites and airborne virus from contaminated bedding and dust [45].  Mink farms 
in Canada for example have been identified as sources of Aleutian disease (a parvovirus) in local wild mink 
populations [79].  Such relationships may arise because of escaped animals establishing in the locality or 
because wild animals are able to access facilities where sources of food and the scent of con-specifics may 
act as attractants.  Hence, it is no surprise that the first case of SARS-CoV-2 in a free-living wild animal was 
in a wild mink with an isolate that was genetically indistinguishable from that associated with a nearby infected 
mink farm [3].  Surveillance of wild mustelids (and other carnivores) in the vicinity of mink farms is therefore 
an effective means of targeting wildlife at a relatively high risk of exposure to SARS-CoV-2.  Ferrets are also 
farmed (for the pet trade and medical research), and in some parts of the world (e.g. UK, Spain) are used for 
hunting rabbits, both of which could provide potential opportunities for reverse zoonotic transmission and 
subsequent spread of SARS-CoV-2.  
It has been suggested that mink could be a true reservoir species [44], although population density and the 
frequency of contact in the wild are far lower than in captivity.  Studies of SARS-Cov-2 outbreaks in farmed 
mink have revealed evidence of rapid virus evolution, together with onward transmission to humans [44,78].  
Rapid mutation of the virus and the potential emergence of host-adapted variants are probably less likely in 
lower density wild populations, but cannot be ruled out as indicated by the identification of amino acid 
polymorphisms that might influence function of the spike protein in low numbers of experimentally infected 
ferrets [80].   
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Scavenging and predation on other potentially susceptible mammals could provide opportunities for spillover 
into wild mustelid populations, although in most species their social organisation is likely to mitigate onward 
spread.  Wild mustelids generally occur at relatively low densities, and with few exceptions are largely solitary, 
with contact amongst adults being typically confined to the breeding season, thus limiting opportunities for 
virus transmission and persistence.  One notable exception is the European badger (Meles meles) which 
lives in social groups of varying size across its wide geographic range and reaches high densities in some 
locations (up to 38/km2 recorded in southern England; [81]). In some places badgers thrive in agricultural 
landscapes and in others they have adapted to urban environments, both of which can bring them into conflict 
with people and may cause them to become the subject of management interventions (e.g. trapping for 
culling, vaccination or relocation).  Such circumstances provide opportunities for virus transmission in both 
directions, but may also be useful for surveillance purposes.           
Great Apes 
Captive and wild great apes (Hominidae) are highly susceptible to viral pathogens of humans [82,83] with 
respiratory infections of human origin [84,85] causing disease that poses a significant and growing threat to 
the conservation of wild populations across Sub-Saharan Africa [82].  Furthermore, the characteristics of 
ACE2 predict high susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 amongst primates, particularly Old-World species [23] and 
this is borne out by the results of experimental studies [29,32,34].   
Risks of exposure of primates to SARS-CoV-2 could arise wherever they have direct or indirect interactions 
with humans from local communities, which is not uncommon as they can become highly habituated to human 
activity.  Interactions with humans also become more likely where deforestation opens up habitats to human 
access and displaces primate populations.  Cross-species transmission may be facilitated wherever wild 
primates are captured and traded, rehabilitated in sanctuaries, approached closely for the purposes of 
tourism, or are the subject of field research and conservation management.  The potential for transmission 
from humans to great apes is of particular concern because most of their important conservation areas are 
surrounded by densely populated human settlements where interactions with people may be inevitable, but 
where local community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is not well documented.  Also, although tourism 
provides much needed income for these conservation projects, visitors also represent a risk of introducing 
SARS–CoV-2 from affected human populations elsewhere.  
Several documented outbreaks of respiratory disease in great apes have been linked to spillover from 
infected humans.  These include outbreaks in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in Uganda caused by two 
distinct negative-strand RNA viruses of human origin [82], human respiratory syncytial virus (HRSV) infection 
in western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) in central Africa [86], and influenza A and parainfluenza 1, 
2 and 3 in mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei) in Rwanda [83].  Human-derived infections can have 
a devastating impact on endangered primate populations.  Respiratory diseases are the second most 
common cause of morbidity and mortality among human-habituated mountain gorillas in the Virungas [83] 
and the second most common infectious disease amongst chimpanzees in the Centre de Rehabilitation de 
Primates de Lwiro (CRPL), Democratic Republic of Congo [87].   
Hence, there is ample evidence for the vulnerability of endangered great ape populations to SARS-CoV-2 
transmission from humans, and onward intra-species spread would be facilitated by their highly social 
behavior, but the potential impacts on their health are less predictable.  Infection in great apes could be 
accompanied by high levels of mortality, might manifest as a mild or asymptomatic respiratory infection or 
could reflect the age and health-related variation in outcomes observed among humans.  However, given 
past experience of human-derived respiratory infections and the precarious conservation status of the last 
wild great ape populations, the potential for adverse health and population impacts in great apes should be 
considered high and risks managed accordingly.  This might involve strict health surveillance of tourists, 
researchers and conservation workers who may come into close contact with primates, accompanied by 
improved hygiene and sanitation, use of protective equipment and safe distancing, with quarantine measures 
where management interventions require moving animals.  Building on advances in human vaccines against 
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SARS-CoV-2, the development of vaccines for targeted deployment in highly endangered great ape 
populations may also be an option.      
Surveillance and dynamic risk assessment 
The sections above describe some of the potential pathways for human to wildlife transmission and onward 
spread of SARS-CoV-2 in wild mammals that may be particularly susceptible to infection.  However, there 
are many evidence gaps which limit our ability to accurately assess these risks, although new information is 
constantly emerging.  Targeted surveillance and dynamic risk assessment provide two vitally important tools 
for efficiently gathering and synthesising information in this rapidly changing situation.  Furthermore, 
integration of these approaches permits them to inform one another, with the outcome of risk assessments 
directing surveillance activities and the latter providing crucial data to underpin the assessment of risks.  This 
creates a dynamic iterative process whereby the assessment of risk is continually updated by the 
incorporation of emerging empirical evidence. 
Pathogen surveillance in wildlife populations is challenging owing to the difficulties in undertaking 
representative and unbiased sampling, the practicalities of obtaining samples from free-living animals, 
determining the most cost-effective sampling design and the limitations of diagnostic test performance.  The 
choice of surveillance approach should be strongly influenced by the primary purpose, which may be early 
detection of infection, demonstration of absence of infection, determination of presence or mapping the 
distribution of infection.  The activities undertaken to suit a particular purpose will depend on various factors 
including the expected severity of disease (i.e. can mortality or morbidity be useful indicators of infection), 
the distribution and abundance of the host species, the availability of financial resources and of facilities for 
sample collection, transport, storage and testing.  Programs for general surveillance to investigate 
unexplained mortality events in wildlife are not present in many countries and where they are they may have 
limited sensitivity to detect early stage SARS-CoV-2 infection and the early incursion of infection into a 
population when prevalence may be low.   
In the first instance, opportunistic sampling of wild mammals through existing opportunities such as wildlife 
rehabilitation centres, veterinary hospitals, wildlife management and field research programs is likely to 
provide a cost-effective approach to sampling.  Moving towards a more refined approach involving active 
targeted surveillance may be warranted where evidence from risk assessments indicates particular species 
or populations are at relatively higher risk.  The species groups listed above could be considered as 
candidates for opportunistic sampling in the first instance, and for risk assessment to determine the case for 
more targeted surveillance.  
A variety of types of diagnostic test and sampling approach could be applied to surveillance activities.  
Serological sampling can be applied to large numbers of individual animals, either directly by active 
surveillance or using sera collected for other purposes.  Appropriate test validation, including determination 
of diagnostic sensitivity and specificity, for the species in which the test is to be applied is required to allow 
appropriate interpretation of results. Serology has the limitation of detecting only historical infection with 
limited temporal accuracy but this can make it the method of choice for screening at the population level. 
Testing individual animals for SARS-CoV-2 infection by PCR (polymerase chain reaction) provides 
confirmation of current infection status and the same sample material can be used for viral culture.  This 
approach also allows the sequencing of genetic material which provides highly valuable phylogenetic 
information on the relatedness of viral lineages and allows the inference of transmission pathways.  
Environmental sampling has the potential to detect recent infection in large groups of individuals and has 
proven useful in surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 in humans via testing sewage and wastewater [88].  Similar 
approaches could be considered for wild animal populations, particularly if the geography of water 
catchments is suitable [89].   
Risk assessment approaches have been usefully employed to identify likely pathways for disease incursions 
into wildlife populations [90].   There is an urgent need to develop frameworks for assessment of the risk of 
SARS-CoV-2 becoming established in wild mammal populations and onward transmission to humans.  The 
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dynamics that need to be considered in such risk assessments include three broad components: the 
probability of infection in a wildlife population from a human source; the probability of establishment in the 
wildlife population and the probability of spillback of infection to humans (Figure 1).  This is clearly a non-
linear (dynamic) process but combining these three probabilities constitutes the over-arching risk of infection 
in wildlife impacting on human health.  It will also inform the potential for impacts on wild populations 
themselves.  Each of the components of the risk assessment will be informed by data on several inter-related 
processes that require careful consideration.  It is highly likely that the data will be deficient for many, however 
such a framework will identify the data required to populate a risk assessment and consequently the emerging 
information from experimental studies and surveillance can be input to the assessment  in a dynamic iterative 
process.   
Exposure of wildlife to SARS-CoV-2 has already been demonstrated [3] and is unsurprising given widespread 
infection in the human population which has spilled over into companion and captive animals.  The likelihood 
of exposure, and subsequent infection, will be greatest where wild animals are sympatric with humans or are 
subject to close interactions through their management (e.g. veterinary intervention, conservation, research, 
hunting, pest control etc.), and where they can interact with infected farmed or companion animals.  Such 
circumstances are also likely to provide opportunities for spillback from infected wildlife.  Direct contact with 
infected hosts may however not be necessary for exposure to SARS-CoV-2, as studies have demonstrated 
the potential for coronaviruses to remain infectious for several hours on some surfaces [91] and in human 
faeces [92].  One recent study suggested that the contamination of aquatic systems with faeces from infected 
humans could provide a potential route for spillover into wild mammals such as raccoons and bats [89].  
Information on the demography and social behavior of candidate wild hosts will be critical determinants of 
the potential for spillover to lead to maintenance and onward spread.  Host abundance will be an important 
consideration although simple relationships between density and infection dynamics may be confounded by 
host behavior and indirect transmission routes [93].  Similarly, aggregations such as colonies of roosting or 
hibernating bats and the social groups of some carnivores and primates might be expected to enhance 
transmission, although social structure in wild mammal populations can also limit epidemic spread [94].  
Hence, the ecological characteristics of potential host populations will need to be carefully considered during 
the assessment of risk.   Figure 1 provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of information that would be 
informative for such a risk assessment.   
There is an absence of quantitative information on the likelihood of the various processes required for 
infection, maintenance and onward transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in wildlife.  In such situations a qualitative 
assessment can be adopted, using the current body of existing knowledge and, if necessary, expert opinion 
(approaches endorsed by the World Organisation for Animal Health [90]).  A semi-quantitative risk 
assessment may be appropriate if the aim is to rank the risks across different wildlife species or interventions 
[95].  Most risk assessments undertaken for wildlife health (due to emergence of a pathogen or for 
translocations) are qualitative because accurate quantitative data on many of the requirements identified in 
Figure 1 are often unavailable [96,97].  Nevertheless, where some quantitative information is available, it can 
be incorporated within a qualitative assessment.   
For both qualitative and quantitative approaches, and especially due to the many data gaps and deficiencies 
in our understanding of the epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2, it is essential that uncertainty and variability are 
captured within the framework and communicated.  This could include uncertainty relating to not only the 
quality of the data used to assess the risk (e.g. published literature vs expert opinion, the biological relevance 
of experimental studies), but also model uncertainty as many of the pathways of SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
between humans and wildlife may be speculative.  Such uncertainty is often reduced as further information 
is collated and it is therefore important that such a risk framework is readily adaptable to the inclusion of new 
data.  The value of such a framework clearly extends more widely than the assessment of SARS-CoV-2, to 
other emerging zoonotic diseases that could have a significant impact on human and wildlife health.   
The inter-species infection dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 is highly complex compared to previous zoonotic CoVs 
due in part to its broad host range [77].  Another reason is that none of the previous zoonotic coronaviruses 
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have achieved the same rapid, efficient, and large scale spread within the human population sufficient to 
support widespread spillover and cross species jumping.  Consequently, molecular epidemiological 
surveillance will be required across this host range, using viral isolates obtained from different animal species 
and identifying the genetic changes and novel adaptations linked to cross-species transmission [18].    
Conclusions 
Although the dynamics of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic are being driven by human-to-human transmission 
with no evidence that domestic or wild animals are playing an important role, this may not remain the case.  
The establishment of a reservoir of infection in a wild animal population would pose a significant risk to public 
health if it had potential to spillback into communities where the burden of infection had been reduced through 
control measures.  Furthermore, sustained transmission in a wild host population would provide an 
opportunity for evolutionary adaptation of the virus, which could potentially influence transmission dynamics 
and the effectiveness of diagnostics and vaccines, although host-adaptations might equally limit risks of 
transmission to other species.  These processes are of particular relevance to coronaviruses as their ability 
to undergo genetic recombination combined with a relatively high mutation rate facilitates their rapid 
adaptation to new ecological and host niches [98,99].  This is illustrated by the recent identification of a SARS-
CoV-2 variant originating in farmed mink with subsequent detection in the local human population [100], 
although the epidemiological implications of this phenomenon are as yet unclear.    
Identifying the wildlife reservoir of SARS-CoV-2 before the virus spilled over into the human population will 
fill an important gap in our current knowledge of host switching events.  Understanding the pathogen 
transmission chain and why viruses jump from one species to another remains a paradox and a ‘black box’ 
in our knowledge of the evolution of SARS-CoV-2.  Studies demonstrating the susceptibility of wildlife species 
as either maintenance hosts or reservoirs of SARS-CoV-2 are in progress and these data will corroborate 
our understanding of virus-host interactions and assist in identifying the ‘missing link’ between wildlife species 
and infection in humans. Subsequent adaptation of the virus has accelerated human-to-human transmission 
resulting in the largest pandemic in modern times.  Furthering our understanding of the mechanisms that 
support a virus host switching event and how the virus adapts to a new host will inform the development of 
strategies to help prevent future pandemics.   
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic serves as a powerful demonstration of the links between the health of wildlife , 
domestic/farmed animals and humans, and the importance of disease surveillance and risk assessment at 
the many interfaces.  The emergence of this virus from an unknown wildlife source has had a significant 
impact on the global human population, and spillback to wildlife may carry risks of enhanced mortality in 
some wild species with implications for conservation.  Hence, it is important to take a One Health approach 
to investigation of the potential role of wild mammals in the continuing epidemiology of SARS-CoV-2.  This 
should include integrated programmes of targeted surveillance and the dynamic assessment of risks to 
animal and human health.  Importantly, this need extends beyond the current pandemic, and speaks to the 
wider requirement for a proactive approach to assessing the dangers of diseases emerging from wildlife [9] 
and the implications for vaccine pipelines [101]. Hence we reiterate the call by Olival et al. [60] for the 
development of an adaptive framework for surveillance and risk assessment of other coronaviruses in wildlife, 
domestic animals and human populations at high risk of exposure, so that in the future we may be better 
prepared to prevent and control their potential impacts on human and animal health.   
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Figure 1.  System dynamics for the establishment of SARS-CoV-2 in humans, environment and wildlife 
showing example data requirements for a risk assessment and the types of surveillance methodologies that 
could be used to detect and monitor infection.  
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